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Government Banking in Russia: 
Magnitude and  ew Features 
Abstract  
State controlled banks are currently at the core of financial intermediation in Russia. 
This paper aims to assess the magnitude of government banking, and to reveal some of 
its special features and arrangements. We distinguish between directly and indirectly 
state controlled banks and construct a set of bank level statistical data covering the pe 
riod between  2000  and  2011.  By  January  2011  the  market  share  of  state controlled 
banks reached almost 54 percent of all bank assets, putting Russia in the same league 
with China and India and widening the gap from typical European emerging markets. 
We show that direct state ownership is gradually substituted by indirect ownership and 
control. It tends to be organized in corporate pyramids that dilute public property, take 
control away from government bodies, and underpin managerial opportunism. State 
controlled  banks  blur  the  borderline  between  commercial  banking  and  development 
banking. Dominance of public banks has a bearing on empirical studies whose results 
might suggest state owned banks’ greater (or lesser) efficiency or competitiveness com 
pared to other forms of ownership. We tend to interpret such results as influenced by the 
choice of indicator, period of observations, sample selection, etc., in the absence of an 
equal playing field for all groups of players. We suggest that the government’s planned 
retreat from the banking sector will involve non core assets mainly, whereas control 
over core institutions will just become more subtle. 
 
Keywords: Russia, banks, government, state owned banks, public sector 
JEL Classification: G21, G28, P31, P52 
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Staatliche Bankaktivitäten in Russland:  
Ausmaß und neue Merkmale 
Zusammenfassung 
Staatlich kontrollierte Banken bilden den Kern der finanziellen Intermediation in Russ 
land. Dieses Diskussionspapier zielt darauf ab, das Ausmaß der staatlichen Bankaktivi 
täten zu beurteilen und einige Besonderheiten sowie die aktuellen Regelungen aufzuzeigen. 
Wir unterscheiden zwischen direkt und indirekt kontrollierten Banken und konstruieren 
aus den für den Bankensektor spezifischen Daten einen Datensatz für die Periode von 
2000 bis 2011. Danach erreichte der Marktanteil staatlich kontrollierter Banken im Ja 
nuar 2011 fast 54 % der Aktiva des gesamten Bankensektors. Damit findet sich Russ 
land in einer Liga mit China und Indien wieder, während sich die Kluft zu den europäi 
schen emerging markets vergrößerte. Wir zeigen, dass das direkte staatliche Eigentum 
allmählich durch indirekte Eigentumsformen und Kontrollen ersetzt wird. Damit verwi 
schen staatlich kontrollierte Banken auch die Grenze zwischen Geschäfts  und Entwick 
lungsbanken. Die Dominanz der staatlichen Kontrolle hat auch einen Einfluss auf empi 
rische Studien, deren Ergebnisse darauf hindeuten, dass eine staatseigene Bank im Ver 
gleich zu anderen Formen des Bankeneigentums eine höhere (oder niedrigere) Effizienz 
und  Wettbewerbsfähigkeit  aufweist.  Aufgrund  einer  fehlenden  Vergleichsgruppe  mit 
gleichen Wettbewerbsbedingungen für alle Gruppen von Spielern interpretieren wir diese 
Ergebnisse als beeinflusst durch die Wahl des Indikators, des Zeitraums der Beobach 
tungen sowie durch die Stichprobenauswahl. Schließlich wird deutlich, dass der von der 
Regierung  geplante  Rückzug  aus  dem  Bankensektor  im  Wesentlichen  die  nicht  zum 
Kerngeschäft gehörenden Vermögenswerte betreffen wird, während die Kontrolle der 
Kern Institutionen nur subtilere Formen annehmen wird. 
 
Schlagwörter: Russland, Banken, Regierung, staatliche Banken, öffentlicher Sektor 
JEL Klassifikation: G21, G28, P31, P52 
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1  Introduction 
Since the time of the 1998 crisis the presence of the government as majority owner of 
commercial banks in Russia has increased steadily. By the end of 2008 the combined 
market share of state controlled banks surpassed one half of the country’s total banking 
assets, sending into a decline genuine commercial banking based on private initiative. 
Was it a short term effect of the financial crisis of 2008 or a natural systemic choice for 
essentially a non market redistributive economy (Kirdina, 2004)? The question remains 
valid regardless of the recently declared intention of the Russian government to start 
withdrawing from some of the core entities in industry and financial sector. 
Government banking attracts the attention of academics. In a seminal and influential 
paper  on  political  economy  of  government  banking  La  Porta,  López de Silanes  and 
Shleifer  (2002)  reviewed  the  causes  and  consequences  of  direct  state  ownership  of 
banks, especially in developing countries. A number of empirical studies have been de 
voted to comparative efficiency and competitiveness of state controlled banks vis à vis 
other  groups  of  banking  market  participants,  namely  domestic  private  and  foreign 
owned banks (Barth, Caprio, Levine, 2000; Bonin, Hasan, Wachtel, 2005; Fries, Neven, 
Seabright, Taci, 2006; Fungáčová, Poghosyan, 2009; Anzoátegui, Martínez Pería, Me 
lecky, 2010; Fungáčová, Solanko, Weill, 2010; Karas, Schoors, Weill, 2010). We also 
observe a renewed interest in re testing by recent empirical data the macroeconomic ef 
fects  of  government  ownership  of  banks.  Andrianova,  Demetriades  and  Shortland 
(2009) and Körner and Schnabel (2010) challenge the belief that the impact of govern 
ment banking on financial development and economic growth in developing countries is 
homogeneous and negative (La Porta et al., 2002); they argue that the impact is actually 
heterogeneous depending on the quality of local institutions, starting level of develop 
ment and other parameters, and can be neutral or even positive. 
This paper revisits government ownership of banks in Russia by offering an alternative 
estimate of the share of public sector in the banking industry and discussing some of its 
special  features,  such  as  corporate  pyramids  and  replacement  of  direct  government 
ownership by less transparent schemes of indirect ownership and control. We also try to 
contribute to the interpretation of empirical results concerning state owned banks’ com 
parative efficiency and market position. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 assesses the magnitude of public 
sector in the Russian banking industry. Section 3 describes the replacement of direct 
government ownership by indirect ownership and control. Section 4 interprets the re 
sults of empirical studies on comparative performance of state owned banks. Section 5 
discusses cyclicality of state engagement and disengagement from the banking industry. 
Section 6 concludes. 
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2  Scope of Public Sector in Russian Banking 
In order to build a sample of state controlled banks we screened individual firms for pres 
ence of public sector institutions among their shareholders. Information sources included 
statutory disclosure by banks and their parent companies, annual and quarterly reports, 
Central Bank of Russia (CBR) publications and website. Bank level statistical data were 
borrowed from Interfax  quarterly  database of Russian banks (Interfax, 2010), Rozbiz 
neskonsalting rankings (RBK, March 2011) and bank web sites. Official sources do not 
break down companies by form of property in a way acceptable from a substantive view 
point (Sprenger, 2010, p.68). Absence of governmental authorities among shareholders of 
record is sufficient legal ground to regard such a bank as nominally private. Analytical re 
ports of the CBR do not specify which  exactly  institutions comprise  ‘state controlled 
banks’. The legal status of bank equity stakes belonging to state owned enterprises and 
banks is more blurred yet. All attributions with respect to form of ownership at individual 
banks were thus made by the author along with the principle of economic substance over 
legal form (funds of public origin should constitute at least one half of bank’s equity1). 
We distinguish two types of state controlled banks2. In a directly controlled institution 
government authorities at federal or sub federal level directly own a controlling stake of 
shares. In an indirectly controlled bank a controlling stake belongs to companies and banks 
whose equity is formed with public funds. State controlled banks are listed in Table 1. 
The three ‘national champions’ at the federal level (Sberbank, VTB and Rosselkhoz 
bank) constitute the hard core of the public sector. After reaching its numerical peak of 
46 in December 2009, our sample of state controlled banks shrank by December 2010 
to 40 institutions, out of which 17 banks were directly owned by the state and 23 were 
indirectly owned (Table 2). To the latter category we attribute the offspring of ‘state 
corporations’3 like ASV (deposit insurance agency) or Vneshekonombank (development 
bank), industrial companies like Gazprom, Rosneft, RZhD (Russian Railways) or Alro 
sa, and federally owned banks such as VTB, and indirectly state controlled banks like 
Gazprombank, TransKreditBank, VBRR, or Bank Moskvy. 
                                                 
1   We regard 50 percent of equity as the threshold for corporate control in view of Russia’s controver 
sial practice in the field of corporate governance, although more liberal criteria of control have been 
used in the literature. La Porta, López de Silanes and Shleifer (2002) would recognize a bank as 
‘government owned’ if government holds at least 20 percent of equity but acts as the single largest 
shareholder. OECD (2005) suggests that significant state control starts at the level of 10 percent of 
voting rights in the company. 
2   On technically legal grounds the widespread notion of ‘state owned’ enterprises and banks seems 
imprecise. A joint stock company cannot be ‘owned’; its shares can. The government may own up to 
100 percent of a bank’s equity but cannot claim to ‘own’ the institution as a whole. The author 
thanks Suren Gomtsyan for pointing this out. The concept of ‘state owned’ appears less appropriate 
yet where the government exercises control through significant minority ownership, as provided by 
the OECD definition of state owned enterprises (Sprenger, 2010, 64).  
3   ‘State corporations’ are entities established and governed individually by a respective federal law. 
‘State corporations’ are neither state bodies nor corporations (joint stock companies) in the conven 
tional sense because by law they are, weirdly, non profit entities.  
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Table 1:  
State controlled banks in Russia, January 2011 
Reg.#  Bank name  Region
a  Direct/ 
indirect  Who controls  Assets, 
RUB bn 
354  Gazprombank  Moscow  I  Gazprom, Gazfond  1,812 
439  VTB Severo Zapad  St.Petersburg  I  VTB  254 
459  Tarkhany  Penza  I  ASV
b   8 
708  Bank Kazani  Tatarstan  I  Kazan municipality  5 
843  Dalnevostochniy  Primorye  I  VBRR  28 
918  Zapsibkombank  Tyumen  D  Tyumen + Yamalo Nenetsk  
regional administrations  65 
1000  VTB  St.Petersburg  D  Federal government  2,732 
1019  Potencial Bank  Samara  I  ASV  6 
1088  MAK Bank  Moscow  I  Alrosa  7 
1280  Chuvashkreditprombank  Chuvashiya  D  Regional administration  4 
1399  Elita  Kaluga  D  Regional administration  1 
1470  Svyaz Bank  Moscow  I  VEB
c  181 
1481  Sberbank  Moscow  D  Central Bank of Russia  8,888 
1623  VTB 24  Moscow  I  VTB  923 
1911  KIT Finance  St.Petersburg  I  Russian Railways  115 
1942  Globex  Moscow  I  VEB  111 
2015  Sibsotsbank  Altay  D  Regional administration  4 
2142  Transkreditbank  Moscow  I  Russian Railways  378 
2274  Noyabrskneftekombank  Tyumen  I  Gazprombank  3 
2307  Soyuz  Moscow  I  ASV  76 
2312  Rossiyskiy kapital  Moscow  I  ASV  38 
2403  GPB Ipoteka  Moscow  I  Gazprombank, 
Gazpromexport  18 
2584  Kredit Ural  Chelyabinsk  I  Gazprombank  21 
2590  Ak Bars  Tatarstan  D  Regional administration  231 
2602  Almazergienbank  Yakutia  D  Regional administration  11 
2748  Bank Moskvy  Moscow  D  Moscow city government  923 
2790  Roseximbank  Moscow  I  VEB  8 
2802  Yoshkar Ola  Mariy El  D  Regional administration  1 
2816  Severgazbank  Vologda  I  Gazprombank  25 
2863  Mosvodokanalbank  Moscow  I  Bank Moskvy  3 
2898  Kubanskiy universalny bank  Krasnodar  D  Krasnodar municipality  1 
3042  Sibirgazbank  Tyumen  I  Gazprombank  4 
3099  Rossiyskaya finansovaya 
korporaciya  Moscow  D  Federal government  0 
3269  Orenburg  Orenburg  D  Regional administration  9 
3287  VBRR  Moscow  I  Rosneft  60 
3340  Rossiyskiy bank razvitiya  Moscow  I  VEB  90 
3344  Moskovskoe ipotechnoe 
agentstvo  Moscow  D  Moscow city government  11 
3349  Rosselkhozbank  Moscow  D  Federal government  1,070 
3360  Krayinvestbank  Krasnodar  D  Regional administration  23 
3466  Nacionalny kliringoviy centr  Moscow  I  MICEX  11 
a Place of registration. – 
b Deposit Insurance Agency. – 
c Vneshekonombank. 
Source: Bank Data.  
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Table 2:  
Breakdown of state controlled banks
 
Who controls over 50% of the bank equity 
Number of banks
a 
2000  2007  2009  2010 
Directly state controlled banks, of which by:  17  17  19  17 
     federal executive authorities or the Central Bank of Russia  6  4  4  4 
     regional authorities and federal cities’ governments  10  10  12  11 
     municipal authorities  1  3  3  2 
Indirectly state controlled banks, of which by:  18  22  27  23 
‘state corporations’(ASV
b and VEB
c)  0  2  8  8 
state owned banks  11  13  12  9 
state owned companies other than banks  7  7  7  6 
Total  35  39  46  40 
a By year end. –
 b Deposit Insurance Agency. – 
c Vneshekonombank. 
Source: Own calculation; Bank Data. 
According to our calculation, by the end of 2010 combined assets of state controlled 
banks4 grew to RUB 18.2 trillion. Their aggregate market share reached its peak of 54.7 
percent in 2009 before slightly contracting to 53.7 percent by the end of 2010, as de 
picted on Fig.1 with a breakdown between types of banks5. The above estimates appear 
on  the  high  side  as  compared  to  the  an  official  central  bank  report  that  put  state 
controlled banks’ share of total bank assets at 45.8 percent by the beginning of 2011 
(CBR, 2011, p.21). That was in between our figures of 41.3 percent referring to narrow 
ly defined state property (federal, regional and municipal authorities) and 53.7 percent 
in the broad definition (including banks indirectly owned and controlled by the state). 
We thus attribute the discrepancy to different coverage of the latter category.6 
State controlled banks are now active in all or most of the market segments, and not on 
ly in collecting household deposits. At the end of 2009 they held 63 percent of the total 
corporate loans portfolio and 52 percent of bank loans to private individuals (Fig.2).  
 
                                                 
4   Assets of banks where state participation exceeds 50 percent are counted fully. 
5   Policy lenders without a banking license are left beyond the scope of analysis in this paper because 
banking statistics does not capture their lending operations. The figure on market share of state 
controlled banks does not include the commercial loans portfolio (mainly corporate lending and pre 
export finance) of Vneshekonombank itself, although we do include the figures of its subsidiaries, 
Svyaz Bank and Globex Bank. We estimate that on a consolidated basis the commercial loans portfo 
lio of Vneshekonombank  has reached 2 percent of Russia’s total bank loans (Vneshekonombank, 
2010, p.11). 
6   Probably in the 2010 report for the first time CBR experts started including among ‘state controlled 
banks’ those controlled by ‘state corporations’, and not only by federal, regional or municipal au 
thorities.  
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Figure 1:  










Source: Author’s calculations based on Bank Data, CBR, RBC and Interfax. 
 
Figure 2:  
Market share of state controlled banks in selected market segments (year end data for 











Source: Own calculations based on Bank Data, CBR and Interfax (2010).  
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From the perspective of government presence in the banking industry Russia diverges 
markedly from the general pattern of transition economies in Central and Eastern Eu 
rope; only Belarus is ahead of it (Fig.3). 
Figure 3:  









Sources: For  Russia  own  calculations  based  on  bank  data;  for  other  countries  Raiffeisenbank  (2006; 
2010). 
The difference between Russia and Central and Eastern European economies may be the 
direction  of  transition  and  not  merely  its pace.  The  majority  of  European  transition 
countries moved away from government banking towards a system driven by private, 
predominantly foreign, capital. Russian banking system apparently evolves in a quite 
different direction. The sheer size of public sector in banking (54 percent) puts Russia in 
the same league with India (around 75 percent) and China (over 90 percent) (The Econ 
omist, 395(8682), A special report on emerging markets, May 15
th, 2010, pp.10 12; Reserve 
Bank  of  India). True privatization of leading financial institutions has been  carefully 
avoided. Industrial policy consists in growing ‘national champions’ within the public 
sector, modernizing them to the extent possible and supporting their expansion includ 
ing overseas. China pursues much the same policy. 
Upward trend in the market share of state controlled banks began in 1999, i.e. years be 
fore the financial crisis of 2008 9. Public sector expansion was driven by a combination 
of organic growth and takeovers of private banks. According to our calculation, from 
1Q2000 through 1Q2011 state controlled banks have been growing by 62 percent a year 
(assets in nominal terms in national currency, not weighted average), whereas all other 
Russian banks grew by 29 percent a year. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 
2008 public banks strengthened their market position due to liquidity support and equity 
contributions from the government, whereas other groups of market participants (for 
eign controlled banks and private national banks) saw their balance sheets shrink more 
significantly.  
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Takeovers of private banks by public ones were another driver of public sector expan 
sion. First takeovers happened back in 2004 and 2005 (Vneshtorgbank took over the 
failed Guta Bank and the viable Promstroybank). The 2008 crisis enhanced the transfer of 
weak private banks under control of the state represented by deposit insurance agency ASV, 
the development bank Vneshekonombank, Russian Railways, Gazprom group compa 
nies and banks. 
Fig.4 depicts crowding out of domestic private sector by public sector and, to a lesser 
extent, foreign bank subsidiaries. In 2010 the expansion of the public sector came to a 
halt and was partly reversed as a product of private sector recovery, state withdrawal 
from several non core institutions, and asset stripping at state controlled banks (more 
detail in Section 4). 
Figure 4:  









Source: Own calculations; Bank Data; RBK (2011); Interfax (2010). 
 
3  Direct vs. Indirect Government Ownership and Control 
While direct government ownership offers a bank a more solid and secure market posi 
tion, it implies costs. Direct reporting to the government enables interference by civil 
servants and politicians pursuing non economic goals with disregard to corporate inter 
ests of the bank. Banks directly owned by the state are bound by general public sector 
rules and regulations that may be time consuming and cumbersome. Core state owned 
banks have to perform peculiar policy functions on behalf of the government and central 
bank (e.g., allocating liquidity among banks in the lower tier; acquiring and holding on 
the balance sheet non core industrial assets; making long term investment available to 
‘systemically important’ enterprises and ‘strategic projects’, including sport and con  
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gress facilities; providing first aid funds to companies and regions hit by natural or 
technological disasters). 
Since the start of observations (January 2001) we see within the public sector a gradual 
ly increasing share of banks indirectly controlled by the state via state owned entities 
and ‘state corporations’. That share now stands at roughly one fourth (Fig.5). 
Figure 5:  
Restructuring  within  the  public  sector  of  banking  (percent  of  total  assets  of  state 










Source: Own calculations; Bank Data; RBK (2011); Interfax (2010). 
In 2007 the government transferred two of its banks (Rossiyskiy bank razvitiya and Ro 
seximbank) from federal ownership into the property of Vneshekonombank. After 2008 
the government assigned the task of taking over the failing private banks to ‘state corpo 
rations’ (ASV and Vneshekonombank) and state owned enterprises, and funded the res 
cue operations. Unlike Fidrmuc and Süss (2011) who regard bank takeovers by ASV and 
Vneshekonombank as direct government bailouts, we think that those cases rather fit the 
pattern of indirect state control. 
Indirect state ownership of banks tends to be organized in the form of corporate pyra 
mids, i.e. ownership structures with several intermediate layers of corporate control and 
a large state owned enterprise or bank at the top. For example, the federal government is 
separated by 3 intermediate layers from Severgazbank, a subsidiary of Gazprombank.  
There might be a variety of reasons why an owner would build a corporate pyramid. 
From the perspective of the government, choice of indirect, instead of direct, control 
may stem from inability to efficiently manage and control a big number of banks by tra 
ditional methods of state governance. Other relatively benign motivations are to over 
come property right and financing constraints and bureaucratic hurdles, decentralize de  
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cision rights while preserving control, gain in terms of flexibility of management, go 
vernance and efficiency. Indirect public ownership opens preferential access to public 
funds while allowing a higher degree of immunity from government interference (Fan, 
Wong, Zhang, 2005; Okhmatovskiy, 2009). The degree of political interference in such 
banks is lower, allowing them to take business decisions fast and to pursue essentially 
profit oriented policies. Looking at data for 2001 2003, Okhmatovskiy (2009) found 
that in terms of profitability proxied by return on assets the banks with ties to state 
owned enterprises had an advantage over banks directly controlled by the government.  
On the other hand, corporate pyramids separate control from ownership. Gazprombank, 
Russia’s 3
rd largest bank initially was under direct control of OAO Gazprom. Now the 
stake of Gazprom fell to 41.73 percent, and Gazprombank’s majority shareholder of 
record is Gazfond, the Gazprom’s pension fund run by Lider company influenced by 
private shareholders of Bank Rossiya. Likewise, Moscow city government used to con 
trol fully Bank Moskvy, Russia’s 5
th largest financial institution, from its inception in 
1995, but after a chain of seemingly innocent corporate actions direct control slipped 
away from the government, leaving the city of Moscow with just 48.11% percent of eq 
uity.  
Each additional tier of a corporate pyramid weakens public control and scrutiny over the 
use of public funds. In addition, indirectly state owned banks sometimes recur to circu 
lar structures of corporate ownership and control. 6.98 percent of Gazprombank shares 
belong to “OOO  ovfintekh”, Gazprombank’s subsidiary company. Bank Moskvy and 
Stolichnaya strakhovaya gruppa own each other’s shares. Mutual ownership of shares is 
usually employed as a defense instrument against corporate raiders, but its usage in the 
public sector might seem unnatural. It probably reflects the intention of bank insiders to 
entrench against outside shareholders or to prepare ground for appropriation of assets. 
Indirect state ownership is preferred by influential insiders of respective banks because 
it reduces their accountability and allows running those banks like their private proper 
ty. Indirect ownership often leads to dilution of majority stakes, tacit appropriation of 
bank equity and other examples of opportunistic behavior by managers. Bank Moskvy is 
a clear illustration of corporate governance failure resulting from loss of direct control 
over a state owned bank’s activities. The previous mayor of the City of Moscow en 
trusted the bank to its then CEO who found himself beyond any control. The CEO be 
came an important minority shareholder of the bank controlling up to 25 percent of eq 
uity directly and otherwise. In 2011 new top managers of Bank Moskvy discovered that 
previous management team had lent over RUB 200 bn to related companies. The com 
bined value of such loans exceeded 150 percent of the bank’s equity (while according to 
international standards anything exceeding 25 percent is deemed imprudent). Recovery 
of those loans is highly questionable. In total the rehabilitation of Bank Moskvy may re 
quire RUB 295 bn of public funds coming from the CBR via the deposit insurance 
agency (Kommersant, 05.07.2011).  
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4  Are State controlled Banks Different? 
Some authors argue that form of ownership is irrelevant to performance and what mat 
ters is quality of legal system, management, corporate governance etc. However, empir 
ical studies using form of ownership as explanatory variable find that financial perfor 
mance and market behavior of state controlled banks differ from those of private as well 
as foreign controlled banks. The sign of the difference is unclear, though. 
Karas et al. (2010) found that in Russia domestic public banks are no less efficient than 
private ones. That surprising prediction was later validated by banking statistics: by 
2010 state controlled banks (in Central Bank of Russia definition) were ahead all other 
groups of domestic banks in terms of profitability (Table 3). 
Table 3:  
Comparative profitability of banks in Russia 
  Return on assets,  
percent 
Return on equity,  
percent 
2009  2010  2009  2010 
All banks  0.7  1.9  4.9  12.5 
State controlled banks
a  0.7  2.4  4.3  14.8 
Foreign controlled banks  1.1  2.1  8.3  14.5 
Large private domestic banks  0.4  1.1  3.2  8.4 
Small and medium sized banks, Moscow  1.2  1.4  5.2  6.7 
Small and medium sized banks, other regions  1.1  1.5  6.2  9.8 
a CBR definition, i.e. partial coverage of indirectly state controlled banks. 
Source: CBR, 2011, pp.25 26 
Table  4  offers  descriptive  statistics  for  our  sample  of  state controlled  banks.  While 
state controlled banks tend to be much larger than other Russian banks, their operational 
characteristics, and especially the cost income ratio, are not necessarily better. 
Fungáčová, Solanko and Weill (2010) found no greater market power for Russian state 
controlled banks over 2001 7. The finding of presumably lower market power of public 
banks stems from another empirical result, namely that state owned banks operate with 
a narrower interest margin. Fungáčová and Poghosyan (2009) analyze interest margin 
determinants with a particular emphasis on the bank ownership structure and argue that 
state controlled banks do not seem to take credit risk into account in their pricing strate 
gy. By contrast, Anzoátegui, Martínez Pería and Melecky (2010) argue that the top 20 
Russian banks and state owned banks seem to be able to exert more market power than 
the smaller banks and privately owned institutions. 
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Table 4:  
Descriptive statistics of state controlled banks, 31.12.2009 
  Directly controlled 
by state 
Indirectly 
controlled by state 
All other  
Russian banks 
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Number of banks  17     27     1,012    
Assets (RUB bn)   628  1,687  156  337  12  46 
Equity (RUB bn)  89  227  14  27  1.6  5.4 
Loans to non financial companies/  
Total assets, percent  41  15  35  21  34  21 
Equity / Total assets, percent  20  12  13  8  26  18 
ROA, percent  3  1  2  3  3  6 
ROE, percent  16  11  21  37  15  24 
Cost / Income, percent  52  20  54  23  39  28 
Loan loss provisions/  
Total  loans, percent  7  3  22  44  13  15 
Source: own calculations based on data from Interfax (2010); RBK (2011); CBR (2011) 
One  important  feature  is  execution  of  social,  geopolitical  or  whatever  other  non 
economic tasks by state owned banks on behalf of the government. Currently the gov 
ernment is responsible for more than two thirds of all investment in industry and infra 
structure (Lebedev, Sivakov, 2011) and most of that investment is channeled through 
state controlled banks. The government’s core banks (Sberbank, VTB, Rosselkhozbank 
and – to a lesser extent – Gazprombank) are pushed to develop policy lending and build 
a portfolio of policy motivated assets (loans, equities and industrial assets) unusual for 
commercial banks. 
An alternative explanation to seemingly higher profitability of state owned banks is that 
financial data reported by them is less reliable than those reported by private and espe 
cially foreign owned banks. Until 2011 financial statements of Bank Moskvy did not 
disclose the magnitude of lending to related companies, so inadequately low level of 
provisioning allowed the bank to report substantial ‘profits’ instead of a huge gap in the 
balance sheet. Strangely, external auditors overlooked that. This episode casts serious 
doubt on the quality of financial reporting at other large state owned banks. 
Whereas lending and pricing decisions of state owned banks can deviate from economic 
rationality, lending on behalf of the government does not necessarily imply inferior rev 
enue performance of public banks compared to private peers. A substantial share of 
profits earned by state controlled banks may in essence represent rent coming from oli 
gopoly  position,  fulfillment  of  public  procurement,  state  backing,  administratively 
imposed preferences, etc. Profitability is thus an improper indicator of relative perfor 
mance in an economy with a blurred borderline between commercial banking and de 
velopment banking and absence of a level playing field for all players. We think that if 
players with the largest market shares are basically non market type entities who by de  
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finition cannot go bankrupt thanks to soft budget constraint, then standard methodology 
of empirical industrial organization might be less relevant for modeling bank behavior. 
One more possible explanation to lower average interest rates charged by public banks 
may be related to corruption. Sub market lending rates can be partly offset by kickbacks 
paid by private borrowers to managers of state owned banks, thus maintaining the total 
cost of borrowing at market average.  
 
5  The State Engagement/Disengagement Cycle 
Since 1980s, state participation in the banking industry has followed a cycle of disen 
gagement and re engagement. After several decades of state monopoly on banking, a 
big time state withdrawal started in the early 1990s. Unlike in CEE countries, in Russia 
banks were not subject to an organized privatization. Schoors (2002) features the pilfer 
of  state owned  banks  in  1990 92  as  ‘decentralized  spontaneous  privatization’.  Top 
managers  and  other  insiders  tacitly  appropriated  substantial  banking  assets  and  the 
physical infrastructure of hundreds of spetsbanki local branches. At the beginning of 
1994, 609 banks, or 29.8 percent of the 2,041 registered banks were successors of the 
former Soviet system of Gosbank (State Bank) and its affiliated spetsbanki (Promstroy 
bank, Zhilsotsbank, Agroprombank and Vneshekonombank). Of those 609 banks, 42.7 
percent were off shoots from Agroprombank, 28.2 percent  from Promstroybank and 
20.2 percent  from Zhilsotsbank  (Schoors,  2002).  A  large proportion  of  former  state 
banks did not survive financial turmoil of 1995, 1998 99, 2004 and 2008 09 due to 
mismanagement, incompetence, fraud, asset stripping etc.  
After  the  1998  financial  crisis  the  government  started  a  gradual  but  consistent  re 
engagement with the banking industry. As shown in Section 2, the number of state 
controlled banks and their combined market share grew continuously for more than dec 
ade, and particularly in 2008 9. Unlike in some mature market economies, the de facto 
re nationalization of banks in Russia did not envisage a clear exit strategy.  
By 2010 the number of banks under state control by far exceeded the number that the 
government can run efficiently. Those banks’ fields of activity and branch networks 
overlap7. Public funds worth hundreds of billions of rubles have been pumped into 
state controlled banks. Sberbank received RUB 500 bn in 2009 as a subordinated loan; 
VTB received RUB 630 bn since the outbreak of the crisis (Vedomosti, 01.07.2011, p.1). 
Now is high time for bank insiders and affiliated parties to try appropriating those funds 
                                                 
7   Rosselkhozbank (Russian Agricultural Bank) was meant to focus on servicing agricultural producers 
and rural citizens. Nevertheless in 2011 the share of urban citizens surpassed 25 percent of the 
bank’s retail loans portfolio (Vedomosti, 05.07.2011). It reflects duplication of networks of state 
controlled banks operating in the same territory.    
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under the aegis of ‘privatization’. A favorable macroeconomic environment together 
with severe non oil budget deficit triggers a new wave of public assets disposals within 
the eternal cycle of state engagement / withdrawal.  
In 2010 both the number of state controlled banks and their market share dropped from 
previous year’s record levels. The government started withdrawing from second  and 
third tier banks it came to control directly or indirectly. This disengagement is arranged 
in the usual opaque way. Insiders and operators with good political connections are set 
to benefit from it. One case is Sobinbank whose rescue was financed by public funds 
and executed by Gazenergoprombank, a member of Gazprom group. In 2010 both Ga 
zenergoprombank and Sobinbank were ‘privatized’ for an undisclosed amount to a po 
litically well connected operator, Bank Rossiya of St. Petersburg. A similar case is Bank 
Petrovsky: after a very expensive bailout by the deposit insurance agency (ASV) it was 
sold at an unknown price to FK Otkrytie, a private financial group. One more case: the 
government of Khanty Mansiysk region sold control of Bank Khanty Mansiysky to a 
private Nomos Bank, and with it went the control over a subsidiary called  ovosibirsky 
municipalny bank. The terms were not disclosed. 
In pursuit of a second ‘national champion’ position (after Sberbank) VTB bank gradual 
ly  takes  over  and  consolidates  two  other  state controlled  banks,  Bank  Moskvy  and 
Transkreditbank. Control over Transkreditbank will thus pass from one public sector 
entity (OAO RZhD   Russian Railways) to another (VTB), preserving indirect public 
ownership and control over the bank (Fig.6). As far as Bank Moskvy is concerned, its 
planned consolidation into VTB group will actually complicate ownership structure: di 
rect public control of the government of the city of Moscow will be replaced by indirect 
ownership of federal authorities via VTB bank (Fig.7).  
Figure 6.  
Envisaged ownership change involving Transkreditbank 
                   
 
 





(a)  before        (b) after  
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Figure 7.  
Envisaged ownership change involving Bank Moskvy 
                 
 
 




(a)  before        (b) after 
 
More state divestments will follow. Vneshekonombank looks for a strategic investment 
partner to launch a post bank on the platform of Svyaz Bank that it currently controls. It 
also considers selling Globex Bank into which RUB 80 billion of public funds were 
sunk. 
Impaired assets worth hundreds of billions of rubles have been written off or transferred 
from balance sheets of state owned banks to their subsidiary companies (e.g. Sberbank 
Kapital, the Sberbank subsidiary) that are outside public scrutiny and disclose very lit 
tle, if any, financial information. Statistically this process looks like market share reduc 
tion of state owned banks.  
The drive to divest grew stronger by June 2011 when the authorities signaled readiness 
to reduce their stake in some of the core institutions, e.g. VTB, below control level or 
even  down  to  zero  (Gazeta.ru,  17.06.2011, 
http://www.gazeta.ru/financial/2011/06/17/3665589.shtml),  something  that  had  been 
firmly denied just a year prior to that. Vested interests inside respective banks are very 
likely to benefit from government withdrawal. Indirectly state owned banks are particu 
larly prone to insider appropriation, and in the years to come the government will prob 
ably lose any control over several of them in favor of those bank top managers and cur 
rent minority shareholders. A good example of a rigged ‘privatization’ was the man 
agement buy out of Russian Commercial Bank, the VTB subsidiary in Cyprus, for a 
price lower than the intermediate dividend for 2H 2009 that new shareholders received 
shortly after the transaction. 
Not every ownership change in a state controlled bank qualifies for the term ‘privatiza 
tion’, so in some well advertised cases one only sees an imitation of privatization. If a  
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market placement of minority stakes at Sberbank or VTB does not affect control, so 
there is no reason to call them privatization. If it does affect control, one has to look at 
the capital structure. As long as the government remains the largest single shareholder 
(other shareholders being portfolio and retail investors) it will be able control the man 
agement  and  the  main  financial  flows.  Nominal  presence  of  external  investors  will 
create value for all shareholders while the bank’s policy will still be driven by the au 
thorities8. After the government has learned how to use corporate governance mechan 
isms  (boards  of  directors,  non executive  directors,  committees,  external  audit,  etc.) 
nothing actually impedes from divesting from the control stake even in core banks. The 
identity of substantial minority shareholders matters. There is a tendency to bring in af 
filiated parties or other public sector institutions, including foreign ones such as sove 
reign  funds  from  China  (Gazeta.ru,  24.06.11, 
http://www.gazeta.ru/financial/2011/06/24/3674449.shtml)  or  the  Gulf  or  Southeast 
Asia. 
In a futile attempt to avoid duplication of networks the government might start profiling 
state controlled banks’ activity and even merge some of them. Earlier or later that will 
lead to a system similar to the former USSR’s spetsbanki (specialist state owned banks 
for each broad field of activity) or to the system China currently has. 
 
6  Conclusions 
Revival of government banking in Russia started in 1999 and was fostered by the 2008 
crisis. State controlled banks now control over a half of all banking assets, and in some 
market segments their dominance is ever more pronounced (65 percent of household 
deposits, 63 percent of corporate loans). The number banks controlled by the state di 
rectly or indirectly reached 46 in 2009 but then fell to 40 in 2010, as a result of state di 
vestment from second tier players. The kind of financial intermediation that the gov 
ernment encourages and promotes through its banks is closer to development banking 
than classical commercial banking. In terms of public sector share and the direction of 
change Russia is more aligned with China or India but not the absolute majority of Eu 
ropean emerging market countries.  
One of the recent phenomena is gradual replacement of direct public ownership by indi 
rect ownership and control via state owned companies and banks and ‘state corpora 
tions’. Around one quarter of the public sector in banking has migrated outside direct 
control  of  the  government.  Indirectly controlled  banks  enjoy  asymmetric benefits  of 
                                                 
8   Russian authorities learned this from the Chinese government that pursues much the same paradigm 
with regard to its core state owned banks, actively luring external investors to buy minority equity 
stakes but continuing to use the banks for large scale policy lending.  
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access to public funds but they rarely perform socially important functions on behalf of 
the government. Whereas indirect public ownership might have certain advantages in 
flexibility and efficiency, it deteriorates agency problem in the public sector. Corporate 
pyramids in the public sector may signal entrenchment of insiders against external in 
vestors and the state itself. Banks in this category are prone to opportunism of top 
managers and other influential insiders. 
Policy lending on behalf of the government does not necessarily lead to poor profitabili 
ty. Empirical research suggests that Russian state controlled banks display efficiency 
comparable to domestic private banks. Our interpretation of this challenging finding is 
that in an environment where state controlled banks dominate most product markets and 
enjoy non competitive advantages, the nature of their earnings is rent rather than normal 
profit.  
The context for a new wave of ‘privatization’ is rather similar to the situation in 1990s, 
only the assets involved are now much better capitalized, mostly by the state itself. Its 
results may be quite similar. In some cases we rather see entrenchment of the current 
blockholders than privatization proper. Direct government ownership is replaced by in 
direct ownership, or is transferred to affiliated parties and public sector institutions. 
Like it or not, prevalence of state controlled banks in Russia might be a sustainable 
long term trend consistent with government policies of directed allocation of financial 
resources to politically important sectors and enterprises. Government banking fits best 
a state controlled economy9. 
 
   
                                                 
9   In the first half of 2010 state controlled companies constituted around 60 percent of market capitali 
zation of companies in RTS stock market index (Ekspert, No.19 (704), 17.05.2010, pp.45 47).  
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